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Abstract 
This paper draws on the need to understand how mobile technology is implemented and used at the 
organisational level. IT is a general-purpose technology and therefore its use involves a high degree 
of uncertainty and ambiguity. Moreover, IT vendors and system developers tend to be very 
unambiguous in their rhetoric about mobile technology opportunities. Therefore, managers have 
trouble to identify the real scope, the functionality and the impact of new mobile applications. 
However, these three types of uncertainties need to be handled in change management projects where 
new information technology is involved. Gradual uncertainty reduction at these three different levels, 
i.e. what technology can do; will technology work; and will users adopt it, is studied in this paper. 
This is achieved through an analysis of the implementation process of an information system where 
mobile terminals are used to give service technicians access to the ERP system at BT Europe, a 
leading supplier of forklift trucks. The analysis shows how the three levels of uncertainty interact, and 
how the computerised parts of the information system are complemented by mindful intertwining with 
the non-computerised communication and manual data processing, in order for the information 
system to work. 
Keywords: Mobile application, IT implementation, Uncertainty, Intertwining. 
1 INTRODUCTION 
The possibilities of mobile technology continue to broaden and expand. Many organisations have 
invested or consider investing in this technology. The present slowdown in investments is expected to 
be temporary, and hopes for the future are high. One area that is attracting attention is the use of 
mobile terminals that can give mobile employees access to central information systems, such as ERP 
systems. 
At the level of the business enterprise, investment decisions related to new technology in general and 
mobile technology in particular are usually fairly challenging. Some industry analysts and 
telecommunications providers claim dramatic business improvements, but many IT and business 
managers have expressed concern that the business value of mobile technology may not be quite as 
substantial as suppliers would like them to believe. One reason for this may be IT’s “ambiguous” (Earl 
2003) and open-ended character (cf. Orlikowski & Hofman, 1997; Asaro 2000). Earl (2003) proposes 
that three important sources of ambiguity are uncertainty regarding what technology can do, whether 
the technology will work, or if it will even be adopted. The aim of this paper is to describe and analyse 
the uncertainty resolution process in a large-scale implementation of mobile technology, and the 
interplay of new and old technology and organisational solutions. This paper analyses the 
implementation process of an information system (EASY- Engineer Administration SYstem) at a 
leading supplier of forklift trucks where mobile terminals are used to give service technicians access to 
the ERP system. The mobile terminals provide its service technicians with an interface to structured, 
written data in order to rationalise the entire service order process. The project was carried out as a 
follow-up to a business process reengineering (BPR) project that resulted in the implementation of a 
common enterprise resource planning (ERP) system across the European division of the company.  
The article is organised as follows. First, we present models central to the article, followed by a brief 
account of the research method. Then the implementation of the mobile application is described. The 
description includes the project background, a number of identified benefits, the project itself, the 
organisational impact and the management of change within the project, and finally some technical 
considerations. We conclude the paper with a discussion of three different kinds of ambiguity of IT 
implementations that are based on open-ended technologies, how the uncertainties interact and how 
computerised and manual parts of the information system intertwine to create a functioning system. 
2 UTILISING AMBIGUOUS TECHNOLOGY 
In research literature, it has long been acknowledged that technology interacts with other aspects of 
organised work, and that change in one aspect affects the others. Leavitt’s ”diamond” (1965) suggests 
that interaction with and among people, organisation, and task are important when dealing with 
technological change. Lundeberg’s ”levels of abstraction” (1993), dealing specifically with IS-related 
change, further divides technology into hardware and software, and distinguishes between information 
and activities. Talking of ”results”, rather than ”tasks”, perhaps reflects the rhetoric of the 1990’s, 
while ”people” and ”behaviour” are seen as two important aspects pertaining to the individuals who 
are involved or affected. Both these models, and others like them, specify important subsystems that 
need to function in ongoing operation, and that require careful planning and consideration.  
Orlikowski et al. (1997), develop the idea that IT-related change, especially regarding partially novel 
and ”open-ended” technology, cannot be fully planned. Important opportunities – and obstacles – will 
arise, and be noted, over time, as people learn about the technology being applied, and reflect on the 
interaction between the computerised and non-computerised aspects of the work being performed. An 
opportunity-based strategy for change acknowledges, and tries to benefit from, the emergent and 
changing understanding of IT-related change over time.  
Earl (2003) further develops the notion of uncertainties connected with the use of ambiguous techno-
logy, suggesting that the actual benefits derived from the use of IT in an organisation will always be 
uncertain when envisaged in advance. He proposes three important types of uncertainties: enabling 
uncertainty, what technology can do; commissioning uncertainty, whether the envisaged application 
can be built; impact uncertainty, whether the application will be adopted and gainfully used. Robey, 
Schwaig & Jin (2003), finally, turn the focus back to the interaction between the virtual and the 
material. They suggest that full digitalisation is probably neither desirable nor feasible. The objective 
should instead be to develop a mindful intertwining of virtual and material communication. We will 
draw on these ideas of interrelations and interactions between aspects of technology and the use of it, 
of different types of uncertainties, and on the intertwining of computerised and non-computerised 
aspects when analysing how a vision of computer-supported work is turned into practice. 
3 METHOD 
The BPR project and the hardware and ERP projects that formed the background for the EASY project 
were studied through interviews and project document studies. Close to 70 interviews with people in 
these projects, at headquarters and in three of the market companies were performed, and extensive 
project documentation was made available to that research team, which included one of the present 
authors and three additional researchers: Linda Askenäs, Klas Gäre and Cecilia Gillgren. The other 
present author has met with the supplier of the EASY application software. The present authors have 
in addition interviewed representatives of the EASY project team: one from the service process side at 
headquarters, one from the division’s IT department and a service market manager from a market 
company. The authors have also been able to study the application itself, and have been given access 
to training material and project evaluations from a market company. The interviews have been semi-
structured (Patton 1990) and lasted between two and three hours each. They have been tape recorded 
and transcribed in their entirety. The material has been analysed in a qualitative tradition. The 
interviews and documents relating to Easy have been searched for indications of uncertainties and 
trade-offs in the development and implementation process. These indications have then been used to 
explore connections between levels of uncertainty and concerning the intertwining of computerised 
and non-computerised aspects of the administration process, when viewed as an information system. 
4 IMPLEMENTING EASY – COMPUTERISING SERVICE TECHNICIANS 
ACROSS EUROPE 
4.1 Project Background 
The organisation in focus for this study is BT Industries, part of the Toyota group. BT Industries is a 
leading supplier of forklift trucks, with a world market share of more than 20%, annual sales of 
€1.2bn, and 8,000 employees. The company offers a wide range of forklift trucks plus servicing 
facilities and has manufacturing locations in Sweden, Italy, Belgium, USA and Canada. From the 
middle of the 1990s onwards, the European division, BT Europe, embarked on an ambitious 
computerisation venture. A BPR planning project to explore IT enabled business change was carried 
out. A shared hardware and communication platform was designed and implemented, and after 
thorough evaluation, an ERP system (Movex) was chosen and rolled out across Europe in a strategic 
partnership with an ERP supplier. 
Having installed a shared information platform, new ideas related to technology-enabled projects 
started to appear in the organisation. In 2001, BT Europe decided to further improve quality in its 
customer offering through rationalisation of its service order process. Moreover, the common ERP 
platform could enable a pan-European project making the exchange of ideas between different local 
market units possible. 
A project group with approximately a dozen participants was formed. The members had different 
background, coming from local operations, central staff personnel, and technology consultants. 
4.2 Identified Possible Benefits 
The group identified a number of possible administration-related cost reductions. BT Europe’s field 
service engineers were processing 5,000 assignments daily. Annually, 1.2 million hand-written work 
orders were delivered on paper to the administrative offices, and fed into BT Europe’s back-office 
ERP system. This was a costly and time-consuming process. BT Europe’s service process 
management decided to implement an automated solution, which extended the back-office system to 
the field service force by providing them with handheld mobile devices for access to the job, contract, 
or product information required. 
The original idea was to use information technology and to modify the business processes in order to 
benefit BT’s customers and the company itself. Faster service routines could lead to more efficient 
service operations. Customers would benefit from less risk of human error, faster and more accurate 
communication and repairs, and more motivated and informed technicians. The technicians could 
reduce time-consuming processes such as work-order and service-contract processing, and they could 
access data about products and customers resulting in more informed employees. This could 
eventually change the role of the technicians to becoming more business oriented. Moreover, 
increased flexibility to plan their work could lead to more motivated staff. The mobile access to the 
ERP application would provide technicians with the possibility to plan their work based on the 
pending work orders, report service orders and assignments, order spare parts, review service 
contracts, and access extensive data about products and customers. Online reporting would also speed 
up the invoicing process, thus reducing the amount of capital bound up in the service process.  
Service technicians would not only change role but also work practices. The physical work-reports 
manually delivered on paper to the administrative office would be substituted with virtual work-
reports directly fed into the ERP system resulting in automatically completed invoices. A shift from 
physical work practices to virtual ones would be required when interacting with the mobile terminals. 
Automated service order process solutions could moreover reduce the administration workload by 
elimination of manual routines for invoicing, processing work reports and service assignment schedul-
ing. Instead of dedicating time to copy invoices into the system, administrative personnel could focus 
on giving feedback to service technicians when necessary. A consequence of these new work practices 
would be to rationalise the back-office function, enabling a reduction of the number of employees. 
IT projects can provide organisations with an opportunity to revise work practices and business 
processes (Davenport 1997), although the opportunity is not always utilised (Asaro 2000). As 
indicated above, revising work processes in BT Europe was an important aspect of the EASY project. 
The pan-European character of the project could moreover facilitate benchmarking between local 
markets and improvement of the service order processes to reflect company best practice. There were 
thus a large number of potential benefits to be derived from the project. However, the process of 
getting there was not streamlined. A number of issues had to be dealt with during the project. 
4.3 The EASY Project 
Although the idea to give service technicians access to the ERP system had appeared already during 
the BPR study in the middle of the 1990’s, the time had not then been considered ripe. Partly, the 
reason was that reliable and cost-efficient mobile platforms were not yet available on the market. One 
of BT’s main competitors had equipped their service technicians with laptops and printers accessible 
at the service vans. However, that project was believed to be expensive and not show the benefits the 
company had hoped for. Managers in BT were pleased that they could learn from the “bleeding edge” 
experience of others. Part of the lessons learned from that project was that service technician 
computerisation should be based on easy to use, robust, handheld devices. 
Another reason why the project had not been started earlier was the lack of a common hardware and 
software platform in the company. Then, by the year 2000, mobile terminal development, and the 
development of administrative software for such terminals, had progressed to the point where 
computerisation of the service technicians’ administrative tasks seemed feasible. Local tinkering had 
begun (cf. Ciborra 1994), but centrally placed imaginators (cf. Hedberg, Hanson, Dahlgren & Olve 
1994) envisaged a more thoroughly transformed organisation than they believed the local imaginators 
did. Although the centrally placed imaginators did not envisage a business-logic transformation that 
would revolutionise the industry (cf. Hopper 1990, Cross, Earl & Sampler 1997), they believed 
substantial benefits would be achieved through co-ordinated action, and state-of-the-art use of mobile 
technology. To achieve potential benefits of streamlining the service process across the entire division, 
and to be able to split the development cost, a joint project was initiated by divisional headquarters. 
Not only had mobile technology developed far enough, but the division also had a sufficiently 
common administrative platform in place to make a joint service administration possible. Unlike in 
other cases where ERP implementation has been found to prevent business changes (e.g. Hanseth & 
Braa 1998), in BT Europe the shared Movex platform was a prerequisite for further change. 
The idea to make BT Europe’s 1,150 mobile service technicians more effective was therefore 
discussed at an annual brainstorming meeting of market and service development held centrally in 
2000. Mobile technology was by that time often debated in media and mobile technology 
opportunities created visions about cost reductions and improved efficiency. Many people at BT 
regarded the project as a prestigious one. EASY could profile the organisation as a company at the 
cutting edge of new technology.  
From the beginning, BT managers hoped to be able to learn from other companies where similar PDA-
based systems for the service function had been implemented. However, such implementations on a 
multi-country scale could not be found, and the company was obliged to become a first-mover to some 
extent. BT Europe managers did not want to undertake such a large-scale and innovative project 
purely on faith, and therefore asked for business case calculations from the market companies. As they 
had hoped, it turned out that there was a sound business case for a joint project, but that no market 
company could muster one for developing such a solution on their own. Based on the business case, 
the EASY project received a go ahead, but the consequences and the details were not yet fully known. 
Among other things, a degree of uncertainty regarding what technology could do was certainly 
present. Moreover, functionality to be implemented also evolved as the project matured. As an 
example, it was not until after the system launch that service managers realised the potential to 
automatically attach marketing flyers to work order notifications emailed to customers directly after 
performed repairs. This unforeseen, new communication channel gave EASY also marketing potential. 
4.4 Organisational Impact 
The intended change was substantial, and for the back-office function it was truly of a reengineering 
scope (cf. Hammer 1990, Hammer & Champy 1993, Davenport & Short 1990, Cross et al. 1997). 
Therefore, the development team had a strong participation from back-office functions to access 
relevant operational knowledge and to achieve organisational credibility (cf. Westelius 1996, Asaro 
2000). Those responsible for the project certainly did not want to provoke sentiments of headquarters 
manipulating the local companies (cf. Markus & Pfeffer 1983), and therefore saw to it that the 
designing members of the team came from local operations, and that consultants and central staff 
personnel were only in the team as support to the ones with hands-on knowledge of the business 
process. In this way, the developers were to a large extent developing their own future, rather than 
being a specialist team stuck in the middle between demanding management and an oppositional 
workforce (cf. Howcroft & Wilson 2003). 
A lesson from the ERP project was that without a strong enough focus on designing common business 
processes, a truly shared computer application would be difficult to achieve (cf. Gäre 2003). The 
project team thus spent close to a year on mapping the present processes in three countries, devising a 
redesigned process, and then requiring the service managers in the other countries to perform a gap 
analysis between the redesigned process and their existing ones. They were required to state what 
needed to be changed in the current process to implement the new one, and if there were aspects of the 
existing process that were essential to keep, and would require modification of the new process. In the 
end, just a couple of close to 70 use cases in the new application supported alternative sub-processes. 
All the others presupposed one common way of carrying out the administrative process. 
It was obvious that the EASY project would require a change in the role(s) of service technicians. To 
some extent, their present worldview and that of back-office personnel were different (cf. Checkland 
& Scholes 1990). The typical service technician was viewed as having a strong customer focus – the 
goal was to keep the customer happy by keeping the customer’s forklifts operating as reliably as 
possible and by getting them back into operation as quickly as possible in case of breakdown. 
However, technicians typically had little idea of the economic aspects of a customer’s service contract. 
Nor were they expected to sell trucks, service contracts or consider when it was time from a BT 
perspective to replace rental trucks. The role the service technician was moving into, with the 
introduction of EASY, would be more businessman-like. However, rather than replace the customer-
oriented perspective, the ideal would be to let it coexist with a businessman perspective and an 
administrator’s perspective. The new service technician role would be a multiple-identity one (cf. Pratt 
& Foreman 2000, Foreman & Whetten 2002). In addition, administrative accuracy and correct filling-
out of forms would now be expected from each service technician. They would in future take the full 
responsibility for quickly and reliably feeding the ERP system with data on service work (cf. Petri 
2001), without back-office serving as support and filter, cleaning data and translating between the 
service technician’s world and the computer system’s. Concerning information provision to the service 
technician, the objective in EASY was certainly not to create ambiguity to make them think creatively 
(cf. Hedberg & Jönsson 1978), but rather to supply them with as well-tailored data as possible, to 
reduce the interpretive space needed to process the data (cf. Thompson 2003). The service technician’s 
focus should initially still be on servicing trucks efficiently, not on making creative interpretations of 
the data they entered and retrieved. However, over time, the development of a businessman-like role 
would require more interpretation of data, such as figuring out when it is time to sell the customer a 
new truck, or realise that the repair history of this rental truck suggests that we (BT) replace it to lower 
our total cost, etc. 
4.5 Change Management 
Change initiatives expecting a change in perceptions of identities or regarding tasks or even the 
existence of work, can be expected to evoke strong reactions (Checkland et al. 1990, Huy 1999, Fiol & 
O’Connor 2002). The need to feel support in taking the step into the unknown is then highly important 
(Schein 1993, Huy 1999). In BT Europe, they have tried to achieve this through ambitious training 
programs aimed at back-office personnel and service technicians, and have provided a filtering 
function that buffers for errors the service technicians make in handling the administrative software, 
until the service technician masters the application at a virtually error-free level. Regarding the back-
office personnel, the strategy has been to cut the number of staff at the beginning of the 
implementation, partly in order to get the remaining staff highly motivated to give feedback to the 
service technicians so they handle the application with fewer and fewer errors. A decreasing amount of 
errors from service technicians will reduce the workload for back-office personnel. The drawback of 
this strategy is that the workload on the (reduced) back-office staff is high and it is difficult for them to 
give adequate support to the service technicians. The learning period for the technicians is thus 
considerably longer than it would have been, given ample feedback. On the other hand, having kept 
people in back-office that would ultimately be laid off, would give them an incentive to prove that 
they are needed, and thus maybe keep their job, by showing that the service technicians can not handle 
the application well enough on their own. The equation is thus not an easy one, and it is not obvious 
that it will ever be possible to determine if the path chosen was better or worse than an alternative one. 
Further development of the application and its use would be based on a mix of planned changes and 
opportunity-based change (cf. Mintzberg 1989, Orlikowski et al. 1997). Some further development 
could already be foreseen, based on ideas that had been deferred from earlier stages for budget reasons 
or in order not to risk complicating the application design that had been planned for that developing 
stage. In an organisation, change is taking place continuously, at a micro level, because people are not 
machines, and do not faithfully repeat a process in an unchanging manner forever (cf. Tsoukas & Chia 
2002). The challenge in the EASY project (and for future operation) was on the one hand to stop 
change, getting people to adhere faithfully to the carefully designed service administration process, 
while not stifling initiative (cf. Galgano 2002) and instead channelling it into a ”versioning” system. 
The process should be carried out in the agreed manner. Change ideas should be submitted to the 
process owner, evaluated, prioritised, and, if accepted by the process owner, sorted into the next or a 
future version of the service process. Preserving change initiative while not being in charge of 
deciding on implementing the changes is challenging, and can lead to re-enactment rather than change 
becoming the ideal people follow (Westelius & Askenäs 2001), or require strong and visible feedback 
on the handling of the proposed changes (Borovits & Neumann 1988, Petri 2001). 
4.6 Technological considerations 
At the beginning of the project, few decisions regarding the technological platform were made. 
However, two agreements were made relatively early. One was that the operating system had to be 
future-proofed and relatively well established so that competition could be guaranteed. To provide 
1,150 technicians with portable devices could otherwise become expensive. At the decision point, 
Palm OS enjoyed a larger installed base. However, terminal suppliers consulted by BT managers 
foresaw Pocket PC to become more available in the future. This led to the choice of Pocket PC-based 
solutions, because that platform seemed to offer a lower risk of terminal supplier lock-in than other 
competing solutions. The other was to build the application based on offline synchronisation update 
methods and GSM networks. Tests had shown that connectivity was often a problem and that GSM 
was the only type of mobile network that offered a relatively extensive coverage in the dozen 
European countries where the application would be implemented. Technicians often work in areas 
with bad network connectivity, such as in rural areas, and inside industrial buildings with massive 
cement walls.  
Using GSM networks, users at BT Europe can synchronise data, work offline and then synchronise 
data again afterwards. The solution provides access to all necessary information through the PDA, so 
service technicians can carry out assignments independently of external factors, such as the lack of a 
network connection. However, service technicians are expected to synchronise several times a day to 
update data both in the handheld devices and in the ERP system. To facilitate this, a one-button 
synchronization feature was built. Because of the selected networking solution, connection between 
PDA and the ERP system via middleware has to be initiated from the PDA. However, the mobile 
telephones the technicians carry provide back-office with a way to reach a specific technician. Back-
office can send an SMS to a technician’s cell phone to indicate when a new urgent work order needs to 
be downloaded and taken care of. If the technician has not synchronised the PDA within a certain 
period of time, a follow-up mail is sent to back-office, where further action to allocate the service task 
can then be undertaken. 
When the system had been implemented, service technicians began to experience the terminals as 
slow. The application is uploaded from resident to primary memory and runs in primary memory. It 
can take several seconds to change screen image. At the beginning, this was not an issue. However, as 
technicians became more acquainted with the tool, waiting for the next screen to load was experienced 
as highly annoying, and gave the impression that filling out electronic forms was more cumbersome 
and took more time than filling out the paper-based version. However, recent measurements have 
shown that the computerised process seems to be no worse, and perhaps even faster overall than the 
paper-based process, but the stress of not being able to control the progress yourself leads to a 
subjective evaluation that differs from the measurements. 
In general, during the pilot installations, the PDAs have proven reliable, the offline work mode and 
synchronisation processes have worked, and the training of the service technicians and back-office 
personnel has gradually led to the establishment of a new work process that is close to the intended 
one. Believing in the validity of the business case, the service process management of BT Europe then 
decided on a complete rollout of the application to all mobile service technicians in all the market 
companies. The rollout progressed according to plan, and now, March 2004, the 1,150 mobile service 
technicians use EASY. At the same time, work on enhanced versions of the application and the 
administration process is going on. Over time, the initial uncertainty will resolve, while new 
opportunities – and problems – will appear and be addressed. 
5 DISCUSSION 
The story of EASY could be viewed as an account of deployment of mobile technology. However, as 
the case illustrates, that would be a too limited scope. It is rather a story of change management, where 
mobile technology is an important aspect, but one that has to intertwine with work processes and other 
technologies. 
Moreover, a challenge that managers face when deciding on new technology investments is that 
change management involving open-ended technologies is an uncertain and ambiguous process. This 
is so because change related with open-ended technology is an ongoing process rather than an event 
with an endpoint after which the organisation can expect to return to a reasonably steady state 
(Orlikowski et al. 1997). In the EASY case, this shows up as a number of projects that follow on each 
other, and as a learning process regarding the use of the EASY application. This learning process is far 
from finished today, and will also surely come to incorporate new steps from as yet unforeseen follow-
on projects. Some uncertainty can be resolved through planning at an early stage, but some remains 
and will only resolve gradually as time passes. 
In addition, new challenges will arise as the use of the open-ended technology develops. Orlikowski et 
al. (1997) distinguish between emergent and opportunity-based change. Emergent changes are changes 
that were not intended, but developed "spontaneously from local innovation". Opportunity-based 
changes are not anticipated either, but are purposefully implemented in the change process in response 
to an unexpected opportunity, breakdown or event. A pan-European project, such as EASY, spanning 
different cultures, different organisational units, and a large number of users with little or no contact 
with most other users, is subjected to many forces pulling in different directions. It is then important to 
meet the unexpected with opportunity-based change rather than by relying on spontaneous, emergent 
processes. Otherwise the envisaged, shared service administration process will not be long-lived, but 
soon dissolve into local variants, and then the shared mobile application will probably become a 
hindrance to development to local companies who cannot afford developing the application on their 
own. 
To address this aspect, EASY has been set up with a process for handling new ideas, demands and 
opportunities. Suggestions for changes and further development of the process or the computer 
application should be substantiated with a business case, and evaluated centrally in BT Europe. To 
allow for orderly development of the application and uniform implementation, a versioning strategy is 
followed, where suggested changes that would disrupt the present version are likely to be deferred to a 
later version. The submission of suggestions is not expected to develop unaided; an IS co-ordinator 
has been appointed and given the task of encouraging exchange of good ideas for use of the 
application. Earlier experience from impromptu modifications of software have made both central and 
local managers wary of unexpected complications, and the service process is believed to be mature 
enough to allow for a somewhat slower process for implementing good ideas.  
As Earl (2003) has suggested, the ambiguities of an IT-related venture can be analysed in terms of 
three essential uncertainties: enabling, commissioning and impact uncertainties. Resolving the 
enabling uncertainty, determining what could, and could not, be achieved with the help of mobile 
technology, is a first step. The original vision behind the EASY project was to provide the service 
technicians with a direct, computerised link to the shared ERP platform, rather than having them rely 
on paper- and telephony-based communication with back-office personnel. The early vision of online 
access proved infeasible. GPRS coverage was not sufficient on a geographical basis, and local 
connectivity problems would add to make off-line solutions necessary. Thus, that part of uncertainty 
concerning what technology could do was resolved. The uncertainty concerning convenient portable 
terminals resolved itself in a more positive manner. Expensive and cumbersome PC terminals 
developed into more robust, less expensive and more reliable PDAs. However, PDAs are developed 
for office workers, consultants, etc, and are equipped with a number of applications that service 
technicians are unfamiliar with and that could cause confusion and prolong the training period needed. 
Part of making the PDAs suitable as terminals for EASY was then to block out standard functionality 
that was not required in the EASY application. Thus, the idea of portable terminals that all 1,150 
technicians could use finally seemed to be feasible. The business case they had developed indicated 
that the technical capabilities expected from EASY had sufficient economic potential. This was then 
supplemented, for example, by the rather late realisation that the application delivering electronic 
work order notifications to customers could also be used to deliver campaign leaflets and offers. 
Further examples of resolving of the enabling uncertainty are certain to evolve over time. The 
challenge in the BT case will be to allow experimenting within the fairly strict, newly designed 
administrative process, and to identify and grow the good ideas into widely implemented practice. 
The next level, commissioning uncertainty, was an issue right from the start. IT projects can easily 
escalate or fail to deliver altogether, and people within BT Europe wanted to avoid this as far as 
possible. One attempt was appointing an experienced project manager. Starting with developing and 
agreeing on the new administrative process before finally choosing the actual handheld device and 
programming the application, and then keeping a strict regime concerning versions and changes to the 
specification was another. Yet another attempt was choosing a widely licensed technology from a 
powerful company like Microsoft, rather than proprietary technology from a smaller, specialised 
player. A final example was letting suppliers “go public” with the case, and thus making their public 
image dependent on the success of the development. So far, the strategy seems to have worked. The 
project has kept to the schedule, and it has also been possible to take advantage of an improved 
version of PDA that appeared on the market after the first pilot tests of the application. 
There have also been parts of the commissioning uncertainty that have been solved through different 
kinds of intertwining (Robey et al. 2003) between the new and existing modes of communication. One 
is that error-free input by service technicians can not be achieved through programmed controls alone. 
To deal with this, a filtering function was built in the middleware, giving backoffice an opportunity to 
set filtering conditions on an individual level for manually scanning transactions before releasing them 
to the ERP system proper. Another example is that due to the way the synchronisation is initiated from 
the PDA, not from the ERP system or from back-office, efficient handling of rush orders includes the 
use of mobile telephones. The service technicians were already equipped with telephones, used them 
often, and will continue to use them. Calling the telephone or sending an SMS to it is thus a way to 
reach a specific technician. But informing of the details of a new job by telephone, rather than via the 
PDA would be an awkward duplication of the administrative process. Thus, the telephone is used to 
signal that it is time to synchronise the PDA. Similarly, since the EASY application is not built to give 
online access to stock levels of spare parts, that feature is solved by telephone when deemed important 
by the service technician. The order for the spare part is placed via the PDA, but when it is important 
to know if an unusual spare part is actually in stock, the service technician calls someone with direct 
access to the ERP system.  
Enabling uncertainty and commissioning uncertainty can be viewed as mere hurdles. You have to get 
over them, but they do not guarantee success. Unless impact uncertainty is resolved in a satisfactory 
manner, the business case projections will not be met. In the EASY project, a start was to have front-
line managers and users develop the specification with support from central managers, IT specialists 
and consultants, rather than the other way round. The gap analysis in the companies that did not take 
part in the development project was another element in reducing the impact uncertainty. Here, a 
problem is that the enabling uncertainty is larger for someone who has not been part of the 
development project, and who has a less intimate understanding of what the actual technical flexibility 
will be, than the understanding possessed by those who have spent months or even years exploring the 
issue. There is thus a risk of not truly realising what gaps there will be between the actual, computer-
supported process and the present, manual one. Since the implementation is well under way, there do 
not seem to have been any major surprises, but the late addition of at least one important use case 
alternative indicates the presence of some impact uncertainty after it was believed that it had already 
been dealt with.  
Strong focus on user training has been another way to reduce impact uncertainty, and so far it appears 
that is has been successful. Reportedly, customers have also been positive to the introduction of 
EASY, and want to see it developed even further. Perhaps the most challenging part regarding impact 
so far has been to get the feedback loop from back-office personnel to technicians to work. With the 
manual process, clerks at back-office could correct much of the inaccuracies that existed in the service 
job reports that arrived on paper. For the new process to work as intended, technicians need to achieve 
error-free reporting. The filtering function described above gives backoffice the possibility to filter out 
transactions for control based on the data-entry proficiency of the individual service technician. But to 
learn from their mistakes the technicians need feedback concerning inaccuracies. Some of it can be 
handled by controls in the application itself, but some is less obvious. Should this job be charged to the 
customer or is it covered by a guarantee, or by a service contract? Is this replacement of this wheel 
noted on the right truck or on another of the same model? Is this spare part in my van really registered 
in the ERP system? These and a host of other questions need to be handled, and typically require 
communication between the technician and another human being, and maybe even repeatedly, before 
they become part of the active knowledge of the service technician. This again is an example of the 
need for intertwining between the new, mobile application and previously existing modes of 
communication. Given efficient feedback, this learning process will require many months. Given less 
efficient feedback, it will take longer or perhaps even result in a negative answer to the question: “Will 
EASY meet the high expectations?” 
6 CONCLUSIONS 
If we look at the conclusions the actors in the project reached and the decisions and actions they took 
at the different levels of uncertainty, interrelated chains become evident. At the enabling level, the 
wish for a light, robust terminal that would be likely to be useful in the service technician job and at a 
sufficiently low price finally found a match when PDAs where believed to meet the requirements. 
Nevertheless, actually having service technicians interact with the ERP system would require correct 
input of data from the service technicians. In addition, adoption would be unlikely unless the service 
technicians felt that they could master the application. The design of the PDA with a pen-like pointing 
device and touchscreen instead of keyboard seemed to match service technicians’ present skills, but 
would require the construction of a menu-based interface. Such an interface has since been built, but 
by itself it does not guarantee complete and error-free input, and has also started to appear annoyingly 
slow to the more experienced users. Thus, what at one point seems to lessen impact uncertainty can at 
another point in time increase it.  
To facilitate the role transition for the service technicians, the error-reducing capabilities of the 
software was complemented with a filtering function, prompting back-office personnel to manually 
check input from service technicians before passing the transactions on to the ERP system. If back-
office would also give feedback to service technicians and to trainers (outside the EASY application), 
the service technicians could with time improve their handling of the application. Thus, attempts to 
improve the EASY application at the commissioning and impact levels had to be complemented by 
manual routines and conventional communication. 
Similarly, the synchronisation of the PDA and the ERP system relied on service technician initiative. 
At the commissioning level, it was possible to build an easy to use, one-button synchronisation 
function, but at the impact level, it rested on the routine that service technicians actually synchronise a 
number of times a day. In addition, to solve push of urgent service jobs from back-office to service 
technicians, the PDA application had to be supplemented with SMSs to the service technicians’ cell 
phones, prompting them to synchronise the PDA. Also, the replication of spare part availability data 
from the ERP system to the middleware being less than real-time, important spare part availability had 
to be checked via telephone, outside the EASY system. Thus, consequences of design choices affected 
the impact level, and required intertwining of the EASY application with non-computerised 
communication support to achieve certain functionality. The analysis of chains linking different levels 
of uncertainty, intertwining computerised and non-computerised communication between actors, 
modifying roles and intertwining manual routines and IT processing of data could be carried to a 
greater depth, but the examples above illustrate our basic idea. 
In technology-related change process literature, it has long been noted that successful change demands 
attention to the interplay between technology, tasks and organisation, and with attention to the people 
who are involved in the change (e.g. Leavitt 1965, Checkland et al. 1990, Lundeberg 1993). Often 
such literature has had a strong focus on planning, thereby trying to overcome obstacles and reduce 
uncertainty, while other authors have focused the emergent nature of change (e.g. Mintzberg 1989, 
Orlikovski et al. 1997, Tsoukas et al. 2002). In our analysis, we have attempted to combine these 
ideas, illustrating how the uncertainties of providing mobile service technicians access to a central 
ERP system have been resolved over time, while new problems and opportunities have arisen. The 
analysis has focused on three levels: uncertainty concerning what technology can do (enabling 
uncertainty), concerning if the envisaged application can be built (commissioning uncertainty), and 
concerning if the application will be gainfully used (impact uncertainty). We have also shown how 
these levels interact, and how the computerised parts of the information system are complemented by 
mindful intertwining of the computerised application and non-computerised communication and 
manual data processing, in order for the information system to work as intended. 
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